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Tennessee's Legal Strategy
The HonorableMichael Moore'
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The State of Tennessee did not anticipate that Lane
would be the first case through which the Court would
address the Title II sovereign immunity issue. We fully
recognized that its unattractive facts made the case a
particularly unfavorable vehicle for that purpose. By the
time the Sixth Circuit finally disposed of the State's
petition for panel rehearing in January 2003, the Supreme
Court had already granted review in Medical Board of
California v. Hason,3 a case from the Ninth Circuit that
presented the sovereign immunity issue in a far more
favorable light from the perspective of the States.
We thus had every reason to believe that, when the
time arrived to file our petition for certiorari in Lane in the
Spring of 2003, Hason would already have been argued and
submitted, and that the Court would simply hold our
petition pending its decision in Hason. Then, most likely,
the Court would remand our case to the court of appeals for
reconsideration in light of Hason. But, in an extraordinary
turn of events, just a few weeks before Hason was to be
argued and after the case had been fully briefed on the
merits, California abruptly asked that its certiorari petition
in that case be dismissed, a request that the Court obliged.
Thus, Lane came front and center as the next available case
that might be used to address the issue. Within a matter of
weeks after Hason had been dismissed, Tennessee filed its
petition for certiorari in Lane; respondents Lane and Jones,
as well as the United States, promptly filed responses that
essentially acquiesced in a grant; and the Court granted the
petition at the end of the Term in late June 2003.

1Michael Moore is the Tennessee Solicitor General.
2 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
' 279 F.3d 1167 ( 9 th Cir. 2002), cert. granted,537 U.S. 1028 (2002).
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Our petition for certiorari framed two questions for
the Court's consideration. The first presented the generic
4
sovereign immunity issue: whether Title II of the ADA
exceeded Congress's authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, failed validly to abrogate
the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from private
damages actions. The second question asked the Court
specifically to address the Sixth Circuit's assertion that the
outcome of the sovereign immunity analysis should vary
depending upon the nature of the constitutional right
implicated by the particular allegations of the Title II claim
in each case, a "context-specific" approach that in our view
was wholly inconsistent with the Court's prior abrogation
jurisprudence. The Court limited its grant of certiorari to
the first question, an action suggesting to us that our
opening brief should concentrate on demonstrating why
Title II, viewed in its entirety, failed the "congruence and
proportionality" test for valid abrogations of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
It is often said that the skill that is most essential to
conducting a successful Supreme Court practice is the
ability to count to five. Since all nine of the current
Justices had written extensively on the subject of sovereign
immunity during the previous decade, we were able to
predict with a high degree of confidence that, no matter
how the parties briefed the case, the States could not win
the votes of Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, or Ginsburg
and that, just as surely, we should be able to count on the
vote of the Chief Justice as well as those of Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. Accordingly, our goal as
we approached briefing the case was to construct an
argument that maximized our opportunity to attract (or,
more precisely, to hold) the critical fifth vote needed to win
the case-the vote of Justice O'Connor.

4 42

U.S.C. §§ 12131-12300 (2005).
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In our quest for that fifth vote, we were presented
with a tactical dilemma of sorts. On the one hand, the
strongest argument in favor of immunity and against
abrogation derives from the sheer breadth of Title II. By
covering all "services, programs, and activities," the
legislation purports to regulate virtually everything a state
undertakes to do; Congress made no effort whatsoever to
tailor the law's provisions to those state activities that
might implicate the exercise of fundamental constitutional
rights.
Moreover, the case law under Title II demonstrates
that it is most often applied in contexts that have nothing to
do with the exercise of constitutional rights (state parks,
highway rest areas, parking, performing arts centers,
museums, access to public gardens, etc.). The
"overbreadth" argument thus dictated that we emphasize
the operation of Title II as a whole and assert that the
Congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity should be
invalidated in its entirety because Title II was not a
proportionate response to any demonstrated contemporary
pattern of constitutional violations of the rights of disabled
persons by the states. Indeed, for the most part, the statute
is unconcerned with protecting constitutional rights.
The "overbreadth" argument had the additional
virtue of allowing us to dwell at length upon Title II's quite
remarkable and unprecedented intrusion upon state
sovereignty while avoiding very much discussion of the
unattractive facts of our case.
But many Court-watchers more savvy than we
cautioned us that Justice O'Connor, even while
sympathizing with our view that Title II represented a
particularly egregious example of federal overreaching,
would be hesitant to strike down Title II in its entirety and
would perhaps find a narrower argument more palatable.
One that, for example, sought to sustain sovereign
immunity in public building access cases, but would leave
unresolved the validity of the Congressional abrogation in
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other contexts (e.g., in voting cases, education cases, or
cases involving the rights of institutionalized persons).
The problem with this approach, of course, was that
it would tend to blunt the impact of our strongest argument
(the statute's overbreadth) and would require us to confront
head on the application of Title II to courts and courthouses
(and, even more distastefully from our point of view, to
address Mr. Lane's and Ms. Jones' unfortunate experiences
at Tennessee's courthouses). The fear was that, if we were
forced to argue this case on the basis of its facts (rather than
on the basis of overarching principles of state sovereignty
and federalism), our prospects of attracting Justice
O'Connor's vote would be greatly diminished, and that we
might even run the risk of putting another friendly vote
(Justice Kennedy) in play. In the final analysis, the
divergent approaches taken by respondents Lane and Jones,
on the one hand, and by the United States, on the other,
forced us to embrace both tactics. The lawyers for Lane
and Jones did not even attempt to defend the breadth of
Title II; they argued instead that the validity of Title II's
abrogation of sovereign immunity should be considered on
a case-by-case basis and should be sustained in the
courthouse access context as a valid exercise of the federal
power to enforce the fundamental constitutional right of
access to the courts. The United States, by contrast, urged
the Court to reject the respondents' context-specific
approach and went for broke, attempting to defend Title II
in its entirety.
The State was required to analyze the case under
both approaches. Our opening brief and half of our reply
emphasized the statute's indefensible overbreadth; the other
half of our reply argued that, even as applied in the narrow
courthouse access context, Title II exceeded Congress's
authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment because
there was insufficient evidence presented to Congress that
the States were violating the constitutional rights of
disabled persons at courthouses.
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The decision of the five-member majority in Lane
turned out to be a relatively narrow one, the price (we
suspect) of persuading Justice O'Connor to join it.
Damages claims under Title II may proceed against the
States in cases involving the right of access to the courts
and (perhaps) in cases involving the exercise of other
fundamental constitutional rights. But the Court's opinion
expressly disavows any implication that it is intended to
authorize Title II damages claims in other contexts. 5 The
lower federal courts appear to agree with our view of
Lane's narrow scope and have for the most part declined to
extend it beyond cases involving the exercise of
fundamental constitutional rights. Thus, the viability of
Title II's attempted abrogation of state sovereign immunity
remains largely unsettled after Lane. As one participant
observed at a seminar I recently attended concerning
Lane's impact, the future of damages claims against the
states under Title II may well depend upon how many of
the Justices are big hockey fans.

5 "Whatever might be said about Title H's other applications, the
question presented in this case is not whether Congress can validly
subject the States to private suits for money damages for failing to
provide reasonable access to hockey rinks, or even to voting booths, but
whether Congress had the power under § 5 to enforce the constitutional
right of access to the courts." Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978,
1992-93 (2004).
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